



The Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505



25X1

1 FEB 1980



MEMORANDUM FOR: Reginald Bartholomew
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State


SUBJECT: CIA Review of Pakistan Contingency Paper

1. We have reviewed the Pakistan Contingency paper and agree with most of the analysis and many of the conclusions. We have several significant disagreements, however, primarily involving the paper's projections of the size of the Soviet force required to invade Pakistan. In our view, the paper does not take into account Soviet strategies that would require less than the mobilization of 15-20 divisions mentioned on page 2/Contingency I. If, for example, the Soviets moved before the Pak military was able to build up and/or if the Soviets were able to gain India's cooperation in an effort to hold the bulk of Pak forces along the Indian border, the size of the Soviet assault force and the mobilization would be smaller. This scenario would, of course, mean we would have considerably less prior warning than suggested (page 3) in the paper. Moreover, we think the paper is throughout too optimistic in its assessment of the amount of warning time we would have. In the "full-scale assault" scenario, for example, we think the prior warning period would be a matter of weeks, not months.

2. In our view, the paper should also consider a Soviet move to block air and sea access to Pakistan -- using the uncommitted Soviet airborne divisions remaining in the USSR -- in order to preclude a build-up and supply of Pak forces. Throughout the paper the issue of a possible struggle for access to Pakistan is not dealt with adequately.

3. The paper fails to take into account -- particularly in its consideration of US moves to assist Pakistan -- the key dilemma Pakistan faces in calculating its military posture: it believes it is threatened both by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by India. The most useful and immediate effort the US could undertake is finding a formula for reassuring Islamabad that it can safely move forces currently along the Indian border. (Annexed to this review are line-by-line suggestions for changes in the text with our suggested new wording underscored.)

25X1

All Portions of This Document
are Classified: 

SECRET

25X1

SUBJECT: CIA Review of Pakistan Contingency Paper

4. With regard to the Baluchi problem in Pakistan, we have reservations about the suggestion (page 11) that the US urge Pakistan to offer political inducements to Baluchi leaders. Such action could prove to be far more complex and risky than is implied in the paper. For example, elections in Baluchistan could come only with elections elsewhere. In effect, we could be urging Zia to have himself and the relatively stable military rule in Pakistan voted out of office. Other concessions to Baluchi leaders such as greater provincial autonomy, tribal autonomy, or variations of either would mean major changes in the way Pakistan governs its provinces. Before urging any concessions to the Baluchi, we should consider the impact on the current government and be prepared for requests from Pakistan to finance any social and economic benefits intended to placate the Baluchi. Moreover, urging the Pakistanis to hold off in suppressing a tribal rebellion is unlikely to increase our credibility as defenders of Pakistan and runs the risk of the rebellion spreading throughout Baluchistan, including into Iran.

5. Under the scenario involving serious political and tribal strife in Pakistan (page 13), we question the advisability of providing arms to a military that could under these circumstances be on the verge of breaking apart. Such a move could fuel civil war. Moreover, some consideration should probably be given to encouraging India to occupy the Sind and Punjab if Pakistan were truly in the process of breaking up.

6. In concert with considering the possibility of an Indian attack (page 16) on Pakistan, it would be wise to consider a situation in which -- with the Soviets still in Afghanistan -- Pakistan, armed with US weapons and sure of our support, provoked an Indo-Pakistani crisis by having another go at gaining control over Kashmir.

7. In the "analysis" section of the paper, we would suggest pointing out (page 7) that because the Soviets are fighting Pathans in Afghanistan their ability to influence Pathans in Pakistan is probably less now than at any time the past 300 years. Also, Bhutto's suppression in Baluchistan was not all that brutal in comparison to other counter-insurgencies; he never fully put down the rebellion but rather ended the fighting by pulling the army back to cantonments.

8. Throughout the paper, we felt that suggested areas of cooperation with the Chinese -- although understandably treated in short-hand -- seemed to underestimate what the Chinese would exact from the US in exchange for such action. We are also skeptical of the assertion (page 9) that military posturing by Chinese units already in the area of the Indian border combined with a political statement from Beijing would have the impact of deterring an Indian move against Pakistan, particularly since such actions were not sufficient in 1965.

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Annex, as stated above

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ANNEX: Line-by-Line Suggested Word ChangesPage 2 Contingency I A

"A major force and logistics build-up by the Soviet Union -- perhaps 8 to 10 divisions;"

Rationale: Previous CIA analysis and reporting supports the lower figure.

Contingency I A

"Reasonably secure lines of communication and therefore general pacification of Afghanistan..."

Rationale: Complete pacification is unnecessary and would certainly be unattainable over a short term.

Page 3

"period of at least several weeks and perhaps longer."

Rationale: A smaller force could be assembled in much shorter time.

Page 4, Hot Pursuit of Rebels into Pakistan

Comments: Although we do not disagree with the sense of this section, we believe that the Soviets realize that they could accomplish their purposes more efficiently and with less risk of provocation and escalation by placing their forces in blocking position along the border to intercept fleeing rebels.

Page 5, first paragraph

"Because the western mountains restrict the visibility of air surveillance radar, Pakistan probably cannot scramble interceptors against occasional air space violations."

Rationale: Geography rather than radar equipment limits the Pakistani capability to intercept air space violations in the west.

SECRET/

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Page 13, paragraph 3

"the ground force balance at the Indo-Pakistani border is approximately 1.5 to 1 in favor of India, but would increase to 2 to 1 with the mobilization of India's central reserves; India, moreover, has better equipment."

Page 18, item 3

"If Soviet troops are built up in Afghanistan at levels..."

Rationale: We cannot unerringly detect a force alert, but we can detect build-ups of forces.

Page 19, item C

Comment: Pakistani nuclear facilities could also be eliminated by ground force units.

Page 20, item 1

Rearrange text to read:

"If we have prior warning, admonish Indians that attack could lead to rapid military escalation on subcontinent."

In the Tab A (ANNEX) section, we are again confronted with differences arising over analysis of the size and composition of Soviet forces required for an invasion of Pakistan, and a line-by-line adjustment to the text is not feasible. Offered below, however, are a few general suggestions and comments relative to the text:

Page 8, Chinese Role, paragraph 2: Add the following:

"Beijing would be reluctant to draw from its central reserve before determining that a Soviet attack against China were highly unlikely. As a result of a probable delay in Beijing's decision concerning deployment of the central reserve, the reserve units probably could not arrive in the China-Pakistan border area soon enough to help defend Pakistan."

Page 8, Chinese Role, paragraph 3:

"However, opposite northeastern India and the border states, the Chinese have traditionally deployed two armies and three independent divisions (over 125,000 troops). One of the three independent divisions has relocated northward into the Urumchi Military Region and no longer would be available for combat in Tibet. Moreover, the two armies are located in the Sichuan

SECRET

25X1

SECRET/ [REDACTED]

25X1

basin some 1,500 kilometers from the Nepal-Sikkim-Bhutan border area and would not be available immediately for operations against India.

A Chinese attack on India..."

Page 18, paragraph 3:

Comment: There are several references to a possible Soviet reluctance to use "reduced strength" divisions -- those that in peacetime are maintained at personnel strengths far below their wartime authorized strengths. It then follows in the State analysis that the Soviets might wish to use full strength units (i.e., Category I units) from opposite NATO or China. Such analysis in our view, is mistaken and leads inescapably to a conclusion that the Soviets would not draw down forces in those areas and, thus, would not undertake the operation in the first place.

In fact, however, reduced-strength units are very much a part of the Soviets' overall force planning and -- rightly or wrongly -- are regarded by them as a viable military force for general war. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that the Soviets would not mobilize their reduced-strength units for use against opponents in South Asia.

One issue that has not been addressed is that of ethnic considerations, which could present the Soviets with operational difficulties. The Soviets are already encountering some problems in Afghanistan with the divisions from Turkestan and Central Asia that have a high proportion of Muslims and soldiers ethnically similar to Afghanis. Operations into Pakistan probably would encounter similar problems. The difficulty that this might pose for the Soviets, however, could be readily overcome. Only a small minority of available units -- even excluding those deployed against Europe and China -- are composed of troops of such ethnic extraction to make that a problem. Most Soviet units (e.g., from the Caucasus, Kiev, and so-called "strategic reserve" MDs,) present no such problems.

SECRET/ [REDACTED]

25X1